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Abstract. Consider a matching problem with n men and n women, with preferences drawn uniformly from the
possible (n!)2n full ranking options. We analyze the influence of one strategic agent on the quality of the other agents’
matchings under the Gale–Shapley algorithm. We show that even though the Gale–Shapley algorithm is famous
for being optimal for men, one small change in the reported preferences is enough for the women to get a near
optimal match. In this case, the quality of the matching dramatically improves from the women’s perspective. The
expected women’s rank is O(log4(n)) and almost surely the average women’s rank is O(log2+(n)) rather than a rank
of O( n
log(n)
) in both cases under a truthful regime. Both results hold for any matching algorithm that guarantees a
stable matching.
1 Introduction
The stable matching problem concerns a scenario where we must find a matching between two disjoint sets of
agents that satisfies natural stability constraints. This problem has received an enormous amount of attention,
starting with the seminal work of Gale and Shapley [7], and has been used as a paradigm in a host of applications
ranging from matching doctors to hospitals [23] to matching kidney donors to recipients [25]. The basic formalism
considers a matching between a set of n men and m women. Each man has a preference order over all women
and an option of being unmatched, and the same goes for the women. A matching between the set of men and
the set of women is called stable if there exists no “blocking pair”, i.e. a man and a woman who prefer each
other to their current matching.
The Men-Proposing Deferred-Acceptance algorithm (also known as the Gale–Shapley algorithm [7]) is an
algorithm for finding a stable matching and its proof of correctness shows that such a matching always exists.
The algorithm works in an iterative way. In each round, every unmatched man proposes to his most preferred
woman who has not previously rejected him. Each woman chooses her most preferred man out of those who
proposed to her and releases all the other proposers to continue with their lists. The algorithm terminates when
all men are matched or reached to the end of their list.
It is known [7] that the algorithm is optimal for men in the following sense: for each man m, there is no
other stable matching in which m is matched with someone whom he prefers more. On the other hand, as
shown in [17], the algorithm yields the worst stable matching for any woman. That is, for each woman w, there
is no other stable matching in which w is matched with someone whom she prefers less.
Under the Gale–Shapley mechanism it is a dominant strategy for men to report their preferences truthfully
[5]. This is not the case for women. The following simple example with two men (m1,m2) and two women
(w1,w2) demonstrate this. Suppose that their preference rankings are as follows:
m1 prefers w1 > w2 w1 prefers m2 > m1
m2 prefers w2 > w1 w2 prefers m1 > m2 ,
and for all of the agents the least preferred option is to stay single. The algorithm matches w1 to m1. If w1
falsely reports that she prefers staying single to being matched with m1, the algorithm matches her to m2,
whom she prefers to m1.
Strategic behavior under stable matching algorithms has been a topic of vast research. In [22] it is shown
that there is no algorithm for which reporting the true preferences is a dominant strategy for both men and
women. A partial list of works on strategic behavior by women under the Gale–Shapley algorithm includes
[4, 5, 8, 11,16,24,28].
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Notice that strategic behavior by a woman affects the outcome of the other women as well, e.g., in the
example above, perhaps surprisingly, the strategic behavior of w1 improves the matching of w2. It is known [3,9]
that in general, under the Gale–Shapley algorithm, strategic behavior by any set of women can only benefit
the other women in the sense that if none of the former are worse off, then neither are any of the latter. A
natural and well known way to manipulate the algorithm is to truncate the list of the reported preferences, i.e.,
to set a threshold so that only mates from some given rank and above are acceptable. This strategy is optimal
for any woman when all the other agents’ preferences are known to her, assuming that all the other agents
report truthfully [24]. In the same work it is shown that this is also true for a wide range of partial information
structures.
In this paper, we analyze the effect of a selfish reporting strategy by one or more women, on the quality of
the matching obtained by the other agents, both men and women.
Specifically, we explore the characteristics of such strategies in the commonly studied setting of a balanced
market with n men and n women (e.g., [12,13,29]). The set of preferences is drawn uniformly at random from
the set of all possible (n!)2n full ranking options (e.g., [4,15,19,21]). A simple measure of the quality of a match
from the perspective of a given agent is the rank of her or his match (e.g., [13]). We say that a person has a rank
k in some matching if they are matched with their kth favorite mate (where rank 1 denotes being matched to
the most preferred mate and rank n denotes being matched to the least preferred mate). In this model, under
a truthful regime, it is known [20] that the expected rank of any woman w is of order nlog(n) . The expected rank
of the men is of order log(n).
Our main theorem shows that one strategic agent is expected to dramatically affect the entire outcome
of the matching. In particular, the average women’s rank is polylogarithmic in n compared to an expected
average rank of order of nlog(n) under a truthful reporting regime. These results hold in expectation and with
high probability. Formally:
Theorem 1. In a random uniformly ranked balanced matching market with n men and n women, where a
single woman uses her optimal strategy and all the other agents report truthfully, we have that:
1. Almost surely, a 1− o(1) fraction of the women are matched with a man from their top O (log2+(n)) men.
Furthermore, the expected average women’s rank is of order of O
(
log4(n)
)
.
2. Almost surely, the average men’s rank is no better than Ω
(
n
log2+(n)
)
.
These results do not hinge on the strategic woman having full information of the preferences or taking the
exact optimal truncation, but are in fact more robust, as we will show later.
Since the Gale–Shapley algorithm yields the worst stable matching for women, any upper bound for the
women’s rank holds for any matching algorithm that outputs a stable matching for the true preferences. Assume
that the strategic woman considers only truncation strategies. The optimal truncation strategy is indeed an
optimal strategy for her among all the possible strategies. Since an optimal truncation strategy yields a stable
matching in the true preferences under any matching algorithm that guarantees to output a stable matching
for the reported preferences, our results hold for a large family of algorithms. Such algorithms are discussed in
,e.g., [1, 6, 10,13,14,26].
We present simulation results in the setting described above, for different market sizes. These simulation
results reinforce the theorem’s conclusions and suggest that the actual effect might be even stronger than the
formally proven effect.
One interpretation of the results is that although the Gale–Shapley algorithm is optimal for the men, in fact
strategic behavior by only one woman is sufficient to almost completely eliminate the men’s advantage. Notice
that strategic behavior narrows the set of possible stable matchings attainable by any algorithm. Hence, one
strategic agent may strongly influence the matching in favor of that agent’s sex, be it the men or the women.
2 Influence under Full Information
2.1 The Model
The Process We analyze the effect of one strategic agent in a balanced market of n men and n women where
the set of preferences are chosen uniformly from the possible (n!)2n full ranking options. In this section, we
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assume that one woman, g, gets to look at all the other agents’ preference lists before the algorithm is run.
Then g acts according to a preference list chosen by her in a strategic way that maximizes her utility from the
matching. This maximization is done with respect to her original preferences.
It is shown in [17] that the outcome of the Gale–Shapley algorithm is independent of the order of proposals
made by the men. Using this fact and the principle of deferred decisions, we follow [15] by describing the
algorithm as follows: a man needs to choose his ith preference only after the first i − 1 women have already
rejected him. The fact that the preferences are chosen uniformly allows another simplification. When a man
chooses his ith woman he chooses with “amnesia”; i.e., the realization is done over all n possibilities, allowing
him to choose a woman who has already rejected him and make her a redundant proposal. In addition, each
woman also reveals her preferences in an online manner and she accepts her kth (nonredundant) proposal with
probability 1k . It is convenient to look at the running of the algorithm under g’s strategy as a process in which
women keep getting proposals and g keeps rejecting all of the offers she gets. At some point, g decides to accept
one of the offers and the process terminates. The stopping point is selected optimally given the preferences
of all the agents. As we will show, the outcome is a stable matching for the original preferences. Combining
these observations, we follow [15] by describing the process using the following algorithm. In order to account
for the property that g’s strategy is optimal, we add an oracle to g that tells her when to stop the rejection
process. That is, the oracle is exposed to the realization of all the players’ preferences yet to come. This process
is equivalent to the original Gale–Shapley algorithm with g acting in a strategically optimal way.
A1, ..., An = sets representing the women proposed to so far by men 1 to n.
l = the number of men who have proposed so far.
p = the man who is currently proposing.
h = the woman who is currently being proposed to.
x1, ..., xn = the men who have made the best offer so far to women 1 to n. xi = 0 if the woman i has received
no offer.
k1, ..., kn = the number of proposals received by women 1 to n.
1. Let Aj = ∅, xj = 0, and kj = 0, for 1 ≤ j ≤ n; also let l = 0.
2. If l < n, increase l by 1 and let p = l. Otherwise, if g’s oracle tells her to stop, the process terminates and
this is the final matching. Otherwise, let g reject xg and set p = xg.
3. Let h be a random number uniformly chosen between 1 and n. We say that man p proposes to woman h.
If h ∈ Ap (i.e., if p’s proposal is redundant), repeat this step. Otherwise replace Ap with Ap ∪ {h} and go
on to step 4.
4. Increase kh by one. With probability 1− 1kh , return to step 3 (in this case we say that woman h rejects the
proposal). Otherwise interchange p↔ xh (that is, h accepts the proposal and her former match is the next
proposer). If the new value of p is zero, or if h = g, go back to step 2; otherwise continue with step 3.
Probabilistic Notations Some asymptotic notations and probabilistic bounds are noted. We say that an
event occurs almost surely (a.s.) or with high probability (w.h.p.), if the probability that it doesn’t happen is
o(1), i.e., if the probability of nonoccurrence approaches zero as n goes to infinity.
Multiplicative Chernoff Bound Let X1, ..., Xn be independent random variables taking values in {0, 1}.
Let X denote their sum and µ = E[X] denote the sum’s expected value. Then,
Pr(X ≤ (1− δ)µ) ≤ e− δ
2µ
2 , 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1,
Pr(X ≥ (1 + δ)µ) ≤ e− δ
2µ
3 , 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1,
Pr(X ≥ (1 + δ)µ) ≤ e− δµ3 , 1 ≤ δ.
2.2 Main Results
The main result in this section is that in the above scenario, one strategic agent is expected to dramatically
affect the entire outcome of the matching. In particular, the expected rank for the women is polylogarithmic
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in n compared to an expected rank of nlog(n) under a truthful regime. Similarly, with a probability that goes to
1 as n grows, the rank of almost all the women is polylogarithmic in n.
Due to the proposing nature of the Gale–Shapley algorithm, any optimal strategy for a single woman w
outputs the same matching not only for her but to all other women as well.
Proposition 1. The process described above is equivalent to g reporting in a strategically optimal way under
the Gale–Shapley algorithm.
Another desired property would be that the process yields a stable matching and all women are matched.
Lemma 1. The process terminates with a stable matching where all the women are matched.
Proof. Let M be the matching resulting from the process. It is stable for the reported preferences. For any
possible pair not including the strategic woman g, the stability for the reported preferences implies stability for
the true preferences. For any pair that includes g and a man b, either g rejected him and got a better match,
or g didn’t get an offer from b. In the former case g and b are not a blocking pair due to g’s preferences, and in
the latter case g and b not a blocking pair due to b’s preferences. Hence, the matching is stable. Since there is a
matching where all agents are matched (for example, the women-optimal matching), by the lone wolf theorem
(see for example [18]), in any stable matching all agents are matched. uunionsq
By the work in [20], it is known that g’s best stable match is w.h.p of polylogarithmic order. We denote the
event where g gets one of her top a preferences by Ca.
Lemma 2. For any function τ(n) that goes to infinity and for any large enough n, the following inequalities
hold:
P (C7 log2(n)) > 1−
1
n
, (1)
P (Cτ(n) log(n))→ 1. (2)
Proof. The first inequality is a corollary of Theorem 6.1 in [20]. The second term follows from Markov’s in-
equality and the fact that the expected rank of the best stable matching is of order log(n). uunionsq
By the previous lemma, the probability of the matching process terminating before g gets one of her top
log1+(n) preferences goes to zero as n grows. The next lemma shows that the number of proposals made to g
conditioned on this event is not very different from the distribution of the proposals without this condition.
Lemma 3. Let a > 2 log(n), and M be the total number of distinct (i.e., nonredundant) proposals made to g
before the termination of the algorithm. Then, P (M = m|Ca) < 2an for large enough n and any m ∈ N.
Proof. First, we examine P (M = m) without conditioning that the event Ca occur. We start by considering a
random order of proposers and look for the first time g gets a proposal from a given man b. Since the preference
list of g is determined online and independently of the proposals she gets, the probability that m proposals are
needed is exactly 1n .
1 Using the union bound, we deduce that P (M = m) < an when counting the proposals till
g gets a proposal from one of her a most preferred men. By Bayes’ rule, and conditioning on the fact that we
are in the event Ca, we get
P (K = m|Ca) = P (K = m, Ca)
P (Ca) ≤
P (K = m)
P (Ca) ≤
2a
n
,
where the last inequality holds by Lemma 2. uunionsq
The next step is to show that all women get a similar number of (not necessarily distinct) proposals. This
lemma is not directly connected to the termination of the process by g but rather a general statement about
the uniform nature of proposals.
1 Item b will be in position m in exactly 1
n
of all possible orders of n proposals.
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Lemma 4. Let k be the total number of proposals made by a men b. If k ≥ mn2 then with a probability of at
least 1− n · e−m16 , all of the women get at least m4 proposals.
Proof. First we estimate the probability of an arbitrary woman getting fewer than m4 proposals. Since in each
proposal the woman who gets a proposal is chosen uniformly and independently of previous proposals, we may
use the Chernoff bound with parameters µ = m2 and δ =
1
2 . Thus, the probability of such an event is less than
e−
m
16 . By the union bound, the probability of at least one woman not getting enough proposals is bounded by
n · e−m16 uunionsq
So far, we know the number of proposals distributed in an approximately equal way among the women. But
this is so only because we allow redundant proposals. For distinct proposals, however, this does not necessarily
hold. In the next lemma we show that when conditioning on the event that the process terminates with all men
matched, we can get a similar result, albeit a slightly less tight one. This conditioning is reasonable by Lemma
1.
Lemma 5. With probability greater than 1− 2
n2
, no men propose to the same woman more than 20 log(n) times.
Proof. Assume that some man, b, proposes r proposals in total and let w be some woman.
We consider two cases:
B0 = {r > 4n log(n)}
B1 = {r ≤ 4n log(n), w gets at least 20 log(n) proposals from b} .
We show that these events happen with negligible probability. The probability that some woman gets no
proposal from b is (1− 1n)r. For r > 4n log(n), this probability is no more than 1n4 . Because only full matchings
are considered, we know that no man reaches to the end of his preference list (up to at most one proposal to
his least preferred mate). Therefore the probability of the event B0 is at most
1
n4
.
In the case of B1, b makes at most 4n log(n) proposals. We use the Chernoff bound, with µ = 4 log(n) and
δ = 4. The probability that more than 20 log(n) proposals are made to the same women w is at most
P (B1) < e
−4 log(n) =
1
n4
.
Summing over all men and women and using the union bound, we get that with probability at least 1− 2
n2
,
no man proposes to the same woman more than 20 log(n) times. uunionsq
Corollary 1. If a woman gets k proposals then with probability at least 1− 2
n2
she gets at least k20 log(n) distinct
proposals.
Lemma 6. Let a ∈ R be a constant, w a woman, and k the number of different proposals made to w. Then,
with probability at least 1− e−a, w gets matched with a man who ranks among her ank most preferred men.
Proof. Since w’s preferences are independent of the proposals she gets, the probability of her not getting a
proposals from any subset of ank men out of n men is
(
1− ak
)k
< e−a. uunionsq
Lemma 7. Denote by Xi the random variable denoting woman i’s rank, given that she gets at least k distinct
proposals. Let Y = 1n
∑
iXi be the average rank of the women. Then, EY ≤ 2nk and with probability 1 − 1n2 ,
Y < 6nk + 15 log(n).
Proof. We start by estimating EXi using the following equality:
EXi =
n∑
j=0
P (Xi > j),
where j = ank (and thus a =
jk
n ) and, by Lemma 6,
≤
n∑
j=0
e−
jk
n =
n∑
j=0
(
e−
k
n
)j ≤ ∞∑
j=0
(
e−
k
n
)j ≤ 1
1− e− kn
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where the last inequality is due to the convergence of the sum of geometric series. This term is bounded in the
following way:
1
1− e− kn
≤ 1
k
n − 12
(
k
n
)2 ≤ 2nk
where the first inequality is due to the approximation e−x ≤ 1− x+ x22 and the second is true for kn < 1, which
is precisely our case. By the linearity property of the expectation, we get that EY ≤ 2nk .
Next we show that with high probability Y is small. We start by rearranging Y ’s summing order:
Y =
1
n
k∑
a=1
∑
(a−1)n
k
<Xi≤ank
Xi
This can easily be bounded by
≤ 1
n
k∑
a=1
∑
(a−1)n
k
<Xi≤ank
an
k
For a = 1, the number of women with rank less than ank is of course no more than n. Therefore,
Y ≤ 1
n
n · 1 · n
k
+
k∑
a=2
∑
(a−1)n
k
<Xi≤ank
an
k

On the other hand, if a is larger we can show that only a small number of women have a rank far from nk .
Using the Chernoff bound, with µ = ne−a and δ = 4, we get that the probability of more than n5e−a of the
women getting a worse rank than ank is at most e
− 4ne−a
3 .
For a = log(n)− 3 log(log(n)), this probability is less than 1
n3
and we can neglect the event that more than
5ne−(log(n)−3 log(log(n))) = 15 log(n) women have rank greater than n(log(n)−3 log(log(n)))k . We assume that the rank
of any of these women is n.
For 2 ≤ a ≤ log(n), using the same bound, we get that the number of women with rank ank or better is at
least 1− 5e−a. If there are more than 1− 5e−a such women, we count the extra ones as if they are in the next
segment (i.e., with rank (a+1)nk or better), thus only enlarging our estimation of Y . Thus, the number of women
in each segment is (1− 5e−a)n− (1− 5e−(a−1))n = 5n(e−(a−1) − e−a).Therefore,
≤ 1
n
(n · n
k
+ 15 log(n) · n+
log(n)−3 log(log(n))∑
a=2
5n(e−(a−1) − e−a)an
k
) ≤ 6n
k
+ 15 log(n),
which completes the lemma. uunionsq
By now, we have a good knowledge of g’s rank and see that all women get a similar rank with high
probability. We are almost ready for the main result. Denote by
Pg – the number of (distinct) proposals made to g.
Ptotal – the total number of (not necessarily distinct) proposals made to all women.
T sm = (Pg = m,Ptotal = s).
Given a parameter a, we consider three disjoint events:
B0 = {T sm | m ≤ 64 log(n)} ∩ Ca
B1 =
{
T sm | m > 64 log(n), s ≤
mn
2
}
∩ Ca
B2 =
{
T sm | m > 64 log(n), s >
mn
2
}
∩ Ca
and estimate each event probability and what the average rank is when conditioned on each one. The parameter
64 is adjusted to the requirements of Lemma 4. The event that Ca doesn’t occur will be handled separately
later on.
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Lemma 8.
P (B0) <
128a log(n)
n
,
P (B0) · E(average rank|B0) ≤ 128a log(n)
Proof. By Lemma 3, the probability that exactly m proposals are made to g during the process is at most 2an .
Using the union bound we get that the probability of g getting less than 64 log(n) proposals is bounded by
128a log(n)
n .
The outcome of the algorithm is a full matching where all women get at least one proposal. Hence, the
worst possible average rank is n. Thus, P (B0) · E(res|B0) ≤ 128a log(n). uunionsq
Lemma 9.
P (B1) <
1
n3
,
P (B1) · E(average rank|B1) ≤ 1
n2
Proof. Since m > 64 log(n), it follows that, in particular, g gets at least 64 log(n) proposals, including the
redundant ones. The probability that out of the s proposals made in total, at least m are made to g is bounded
using the Chernoff bound. Set µ = sn ≤ m2 . Then P (B1) < e−
m
6 < e−64log(n) = 1
n3
The outcome of the algorithm is a full matching where all the women get at least one proposal. Hence, the
worst possible average rank is n. Thus, P (B1) · E(res|B1) ≤ 1n2 . uunionsq
The next lemma implies the first part of Theorem 1 and it will be used later to prove the bound the average
men’s rank. The bound for the expected women’s rank will be proven separately.
Lemma 10. Let τ(n) be any function that goes to infinity as a function of n. Then, there exist constants
c, d > 0 such that w.h.p. the expected rank for women is less than c · τ(n) log2(n), and any arbitrary women get
a match with one of their top d · τ(n) log2(n) options.
Proof. First, we restrict the analysis to the case where g gets matched with one of her top
√
τ(n) log(n) men.
By Lemma 2 this event happens with probability approaching 1.
From Lemmas 8 and 9, the events B0 and B1 are negligible and only B2 should be considered.
By Lemma 3 and the union bound, the probability of g getting fewer than nτ(n) log(n) proposals is at most
n
τ(n) log(n) · 2an = 2√τ(n) .
By Lemma 4, with probability at least 1− 1
n3
, each woman gets at least m4 proposals.
By Lemma 5, with probability at least 1− 2
n2
, each woman gets at least m80 log(n) distinct proposals.
By Lemma 7, with probability at least 1− 1
n2
, the average rank of the women is
6n
m
80 log(n)
+ 15 log(n) =
6n
n
τ(n) log(n)
80 log(n)
+ 15 log(n).
Hence, we bound the average rank with c′τ(n) log2(n) for some constant c′ and large enough n. The events in
B2 not included in the calculations are of order of
1
n . Even when we assume worst possible match in these cases,
it will only add a constant factor to the average rank. Thus, getting the requested.
In order to show that almost all the women get a good matching, we start with the same arguments as
before. Each woman gets at least n
80τ(n) log2(n)
distinct proposals. Let τ0(n) be any function that goes to infinity
as a function of n. By Lemma 6, the probability that a woman with that number of proposals getting a rank
worse than 80τ(n)τ0(n) log
2(n) is no greater than e−τ0(n) and goes to 0. τ0(n), τ(n) may be chosen such that
τ0(n)τ(n) < log
(n), which completes the proof.
uunionsq
In [20] it is shown that with probability that goes to 1 any stable matching with an average women’s rank
of order of k has an average men’s rank that is of order nk . Thus, the first part of Lemma 10 gives a bound on
the average men’s rank.
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Corollary 2. For any  > 0, w.h.p. the average men’s rank is of order τ
(
n
log2+(n)
)
.
In the last part of this section, we bound the expected rank of the women.
Lemma 11. For a > 2 log(n) there exist c > 0 such that E(average rank|B2) < ca log2(n).
Proof. Let M be the random variable counting the number of distinct proposals made to g. By Lemma 4, for
any realization m of M , all the women get at least m4 proposals with probability at least 1− 1n3 .
By Lemma 5, all of the women get at least m80 log(n) distinct proposals with probability at least 1− 2n2 .
For a > 2 log(n), Lemma 3 holds.
By Lemma 7 we conclude that with probability 1− 1
n2
, the expected women’s rank is
≤ 1
n
15n log(n) + n∑
m=64 log(n)
(
2a
n
)
·
(
6n
m
80 log(n)
)
≤ ca log2(n)
for some constant c and large enough n. uunionsq
At this point, we can deduce that in expected women’s rank is O(log4(n)), using a = 7 log2(n) and verifying
that all “bad” scenarios happen with small enough probability.
Proof. Let X be the random variable for the average women’s rank. The expected rank is given by -
P (B0)E[X|B0] + P (B1)E[X|B1] + P (B2)E[X|B2] + P (Cac)E[X|Cac]
for any a > 2 log(n). Setting a = 7 log2(n) and using Lemma 2 we get that
≤ 1000 log3(n) + 1
n2
+ 1 · 7c log4(n) + 1
n
· n
= O(log4(n))
uunionsq
We conjecture that the actual expected rank is of order O(log2(n)) and we examine this conjecture in the
next parts.
2.3 The Set of Stable Husbands
An alternative point of view about the effect of a single strategic woman on the entire market is given via
observation on the set of stable husbands for each woman. A man m is called a stable husband of w if there is
a stable matching in which they are matched together.
By the optimality of g’s strategy, g gets a proposal from her best stable husband b0. Due to the lattice
structure of the set of stable matchings, it is known that she is his worst stable wife (e.g., [27]). Thus, we know
that at some point in the process b0 proposed to his second worst woman, g0, and was rejected. Since all the
women are eventually matched, we know that g0 ends up with a proposal from her best stable husband. In the
same manner, this event initiates a series of events that eventually prove some set of women are all guaranteed
to be matched to their best stable husband at the end of the process.
Assume that the size of this set is distributed like a size of a cycle in a random permutation. Then, with
constant probability, at least fraction of the women are matched to their best stable husband. In addition, as
the experimental results in part 2.5 show, we conjecture that the expected number of women getting their best
stable matching is n2 .
Note that g received a proposal not only from her second best stable husband but also from all of her
possible stable husbands. Let g’s second best stable husband be b1. If we could reason that she is his second
worst stable wife, we would have got a new set of women guaranteed to be matched to their second best stable
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possible husband. By Theorem 2 in [27], this is true when ordering the stable spouses with repetitions (one for
each possible stable matching). Unfortunately, this may not be the case when counting each spouse only once.
It will be interesting to see if we could show that w.h.p. this is still true even for the distinct case.
It seems that it would be possible to show that at least fraction of size 2−k of the women are expected to
be matched to their kth stable husband. Furthermore, it is known [20] that the expected rank of a woman who
is matched to her best stable husband is O(log(n)). Looking at the process described in the previous section,
we observe that each temporarily best proposer to the strategic woman in the rejecting part of the process
(i.e., after the men-optimal match is reached) is a stable husband and is randomly located in the proposed-to
woman’s preference list. Hence, the rank of the woman when she is matched to her kth stable husband is
expected to be twice as good compared to when she is matched to the (k + 1)th stable husband. Hence, the
expected rank of a woman who is matched to her kth stable husband is 2k−1 log(n). Notice that some of the
women have few stable husbands (see [21]) and it is unclear how to handle this in a rigorous way. Combining
these two observations rigorously hopefully will yield an improved bound of order 12 log
2(n) for the expected
rank of the women.
2.4 Unbalanced Market Perspective
An unbalanced market of n men and n− 1 women can be described as a balanced market of size 2n in which
one woman rejects all of the proposals made to her. In this case, the men’s utility from being matched with her
is irrelevant and may be ordered arbitrarily. In this market, assuming uniform and independent preferences,
the average rank of the women is of order O(log(n)) even in the women-pessimal matching [2]. On the other
hand, a truthful balanced market can be viewed as a market in which this one woman decides not to trim her
preference list at all. In this case, the average women’s rank is of order O( nlog(n)) in the woman-pessimal match.
Adding the results of this paper, we get that a strategic woman can affect this range of ranks in an almost
continuous way. To see this, observe that as long as all the men are matched at the end of the process, all of
the lemmas in the previous section hold if we choose a suitable set Ca. An interesting corollary is that if g’s list
is of length of order
√
n and all the other lists are long enough, we get that the women’s rank is around
√
n up
to a logarithmic factor. By the hyperbola matching rule, this match captures some of the properties of fairness
between the sexes.
Another observation is for the case of lists that are uniformly ordered of different lengths. This scenario
can be described as a market with full preferences where each woman decides how she trims her list. In this
case, the expected rank is asymptotically determined by the woman with the shortest list. By using different
truncations, the women may induce any possible stable matching (see Theorem 4 in [17]). It should be noted
that when there are many strategic agents there are more profitable actions that a coalition of agents may
achieve.
2.5 Experimental Results
The theoretical bounds of the previous section are quite impressive asymptomatically, but for real-life market,
they are not of much use. For a better understanding of the behavior in typical market sizes, we simulated
different markets. We tested our settings for market sizes for n between 100 to 10, 000 in leaps of 20. For any
market size, the mean of average ranks over 100 iterations was calculated.
Figure 1 shows the mean of the average ranks for men and women, in the truthful and the strategic scenarios.
Figure 2 zooms in on the mean of the average ranks for women in the strategic scenario.
For the same settings, we counted the number of women who got their best stable husband in the strategic
scenario. It would appear that in expectation half of the women get their best stable husband when another
woman act strategically. For comparison, we also count the number of women who got their worst stable
husband and the women who got matched to either of them. The results are shown in Figure 3. The simulation
supports the intuition described in Section 2.3.
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Fig. 1. Mean average rank of men and women in both scenarios
3 Discussion and Future Work
3.1 Actual Expected Rank
We’ve shown that the expected women’s rank is O(log4(n)). A logarithmic factor was added since the number of
distinct proposals to an arbitrary woman was bounded by a fraction of order O( 1log(n)) of the distinct proposals
made to g. In fact, in most cases, we can show that those two are the same up to a constant multiplicative factor.
Showing this rigorously will prove that the expected rank is of order O(log3(n)). It will also help to conclude
that the expected rank is Ω(log2(n)). However, additional work is needed in this direction. An alternative
direction is to formalize the observations stated in Section 2.3.
3.2 Bayesian Information
In the settings of this work, g is assumed to have full information on the market and thus knows how to choose
an optimal strategy. This assumption is later relaxed to having access to an oracle that hints when to terminate
a process. Most of the Lemmas do not directly use g’s knowledge of the other preferences. Although it is
tempting to deduce that this implies exactly the same results when g knows only the other lists’ distributions,
it is not the case. For example, assume that g has an extremely high utility for not staying single and hardly
distinguishes between all possible mates. In that case, it is likely that g’s optimal strategy is just to report
truthfully and thus guarantees that she will be matched. But now, g has no effect on the rest of the market and
the expected rank for all agents is unchanged. Note that although g’s rank isn’t monotone in her truncation
and she needs to be careful not to trim her list too much, the average rank of all the other women is indeed
monotone in g’s decision and they can only benefit from g being too picky.
The optimal strategy of g given she have Bayesian information is discussed in [4, 24]. When the uniform
independent assumption holds, truncation strategy is still optimal for her when she maximizes her expected
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Fig. 2. Mean average rank of women with strategic agent compared to log(n) and log2(n)
utility, and the exact point of truncation is determined by her utility function. Furthermore, [4] shows that
reduction in the risk aversion causes the length of g’s list after truncation to be negligible compared to the
number of agents. If we assume truncation in Θ(log2(n)) we get similar results to those of the full knowledge
model: either the strategy was successful and the expected rank is O(log4(n)) or the strategic woman is un-
matched and we are in a n-men (n− 1)-women case. In this case, it should be reasonable to say that the other
women get rank log(n) due to [2]. A more rigorous analysis is needed since the fact that g’s rank when matched
with her best stable husband is worse than her truncation location might imply something about the preference
lists of the other agents.
Other Distributions The independent uniform distribution of the preferences is widely common assumption
in theoretical research, even though in real-life matching markets it is not always justified to assume such a
distribution. The following distribution (presented in [11]) preserves some of the properties that were used while
adding correlation between the preferences. Men still choose the preferences online as in the process before but
instead of choosing uniformly between the women, they use an arbitrary distribution Dn over the set of women,
thus making some of the women more popular than others while keeping variety in the men’s preferences. It
seems the result of our work may be extended to this distribution with minor adjustments assuming Dn doesn’t
make no women extremely popular or unpopular. The main constraint is that no woman is much more popular
than the others; i.e. constraints on maxx,y∈[n]
Dn(x)
Dn(y) or Ex,y∈[n]
Dn(x)
Dn(y) will hopefully be sufficient for us to get
similar results to those received in the uniform case.
3.3 Many Strategic Women
As we have seen, the fact that one agent acts strategically affects in a nontrivial way the quality of the matching
from the other women’s perspective. This raises some interesting questions about a scenario in which the number
of women act strategically.
Full Information How many women need to act strategically in order to induce the women-optimal
matching? The intuition in Section 2.3 suggests that this number should be close to the number of cycles in a
random permutation, i.e., order of log(n).
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Fig. 3. Number of women who gets best/worst/(best or worst) stable match
Bayesian Information Almost all of the women benefit from not reporting their preferences truthfully,
given that the other women are truthful. On the other hand, as soon as at least one woman truncates her
list, many of the other women will have already promised a better match and will not gain much from not
being truthful (their probability of staying unmatched is insensitive to the truncation of the first woman). It is
interesting to examine the dynamics of the strategies in such environments (with some suitable distributions
of the preferences and cardinality over the matchings). The existence of equilibrium in truncation strategies
under incomplete information is proved in [4]. Some considerable directions for further research:
– In many real-life matchings, the players report their preferences to a centralized mechanism that runs the
algorithm for them. Assume that the women report to the mechanism in an order that is known in advance.
How would it affect the strategies of the women?
– Assume that the men can truncate their lists as well. What would be the set of equilibria and how would a
centralized mechanism affects it?
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